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Abstract
Standard models of moral hazard predict a negative relationship between risk and incentives,
but the empirical work has not con￿rmed this prediction. In this paper, we propose a model
with adverse selection followed by moral hazard, where eﬀo r ta n dt h ed e g r e eo fr i s ka v e r s i o n
are private information of an agent who can control the mean and the variance of pro￿ts. For
a given contract, more risk-averse agents supply more eﬀort in risk reduction. If the marginal
utility of incentives decreases with risk aversion, more risk-averse agents prefer lower-incentive
contracts; thus, in the optimal contract, incentives are positively correlated with endogenous
risk. In contrast, if risk aversion is high enough, the possibility of reduction in risk makes the
marginal utility of incentives increasing in risk aversion and, in this case, risk and incentives
are negatively related.
1 Introduction
Moral hazard plays a central role in problems involving delegation of tasks. When the principal
cannot perfectly observe the eﬀort exerted by a risk-averse agent, the payment must be designed
taking into account the trade-oﬀ between incentives and risk sharing. As the optimal level of
incentives depends on the variance of output, the relationship between risk and incentives is an
important testable implication of incentive models.
Standard models of moral hazard predict a negative relationship between risk and incentives.
The central reference is the model presented in Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987). They analyze the
conditions in which optimal contracts are linear, that is, the agent￿s payoﬀ is a ￿xed part plus a
proportion of pro￿ts. In their model, the negative relationship between risk and incentives results
from the interaction between these two variables in the risk premium of the agent. As the agent is
risk averse and incentives put risk in agent￿s payoﬀ, incentives incur a cost in utility. At the optimal
incentive, an increase in risk is balanced by a reduction in incentives.
The empirical work does not verify the negative relationship between risk and incentives, and
sometimes ￿nds opposite results. Prendergast (2002) presents a survey of empirical studies in
three application ￿elds, namely, executive compensation, sharecropping and franchising. Positive
or insigni￿cant relationships are found in the three ￿elds and negative relationship is found only
1in studies about executive compensation. The conclusion is that the evidence is weak. Similarly,
in the insurance literature, the monotone relationship between risk and coverage is not veri￿ed as
reported in Chiappori and SalaniØ (2000).
The lack of empirical support has stimulated the search for alternative models, compatible with
the observed facts. Prendergast (2002) suggests a theoretical model that assumes monitoring is
harder in riskier environments. As incentives are a substitute for monitoring, incentives and risk
are positively related. His model departs from Holmstrom-Milgrom structure and risk aversion does
not play any role. Ghatak and Pandey (2000) analyze contract forms in agriculture developing a
moral hazard model with risk neutral agents and limited liability. Their model is related to ours
as the agent controls mean and variance of output; however, as limited liability induces riskier
behavior, they assume it is costly to the agent to increase the risk of the project.
We propose a model with adverse selection, moral hazard and multitask. Principal is risk neutral
and agent is risk averse. Multitask models were ￿rst developed in Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991),
but in these models, eﬀort controls exclusively the mean of the pro￿ts. In our work, we consider
the possibility of manager to control the variance of the pro￿ts. Note that the resulting variance
is endogenous, and we can de￿ne two types of risk: the exogenous risk is the intrinsic risk of the
￿rm, and the endogenous risk is the one resulting from the eﬀort of the agent in reducing variance.
Another feature in our model is the presence of adverse selection before moral hazard. The principal
does not know the risk aversion of the agent and designs a menu of contracts so that self-selection
reveals the type of the agent. Sung (1995) extends the Holmstrom-Milgrom model showing that
linear contracts are optimal in moral hazard problems in which the agent controls risk. Sung (2002)
shows that linear contracts are optimal for mixed models of adverse selection before moral hazard.
His model is close to ours as variance is controllable, however, as he models an observable project
choice, variance is assumed to be a contractible variable, while we assume the principal cannot
observe the choice of variance. Although the optimality of linear contract is not established for our
model, we assume linearity and restrict the analysis to the space of linear contracts.
When the agent cannot control the risk of the project, the marginal cost of incentive is higher
for an agent with more risk aversion. For this reason, more risk-averse agents select lower-powered
incentive contracts. However, when agents can exert eﬀort in risk reduction, the direction of
selection may change. An agent with high risk-aversion may prefer a high incentive contract,
as he can reduce risk and the cost associated with risk. Technically speaking, our model does not
2have the single-crossing property. Consequently, the relationship between the incentive given to the
agent and his risk aversion is ambiguous. We computed the optimal contracts for representative
situations and found that the relationship between endogenous risk and incentives is ambiguous. For
a set of agent types with high risk-aversion, incentives and endogenous risk are negatively related.
Conversely, for a set of agents with low risk-aversion, the relationship is positive. With respect
to exogenous risk, the Holmstrom-Milgrom result is preserved: exogenous risk and incentives are
negatively related. In Araujo and Moreira (2001b), a model akin to the one presented here is applied
to the insurance market and an ambiguous relationship between coverage and risk is found.
In Section 2, we present the general model. In Section 3, we give two examples. First, the
single-task model is examined and the traditional relationship between risk and incentives is found.
In the second example, we present a multitask model where the agent can control the risk. In
Section 4, we compute the optimal contracts for relevant cases of multitask model and we ￿nd
positive and negative relationships. In Section 5 we state the concluding remarks. In Appendix A,
we discuss, in general terms, implementability and optimality without the single-crossing property,
and, in Appendix B, we examine the technical conditions for computing the optimal contract in
the multitask example.
2T h e M o d e l
The principal delegates the management of the ￿rm to the agent, whose eﬀort can aﬀect the
probability distribution of the pro￿ts. Let e be the vector of eﬀorts and z be the pro￿ts, with
normal distribution N(￿(e),σ2(e)).L e tc(e) denote the cost of the eﬀort for the agent. The agent
has exponential utility with risk aversion θ > 0, uniformly distributed on Θ =[ θa,θb].A tt h et i m e
of contracting, the agent knows his risk aversion, but the principal does not. We will occasionally
refer to θ as the type of the agent. We assume the wage is a linear function of the pro￿ts, that is,
w = αz + β, 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. The contract parameter α is the proportion of the pro￿ts received by the
agent and is called the incentive, or the power, of the contract. The parameter β is the ￿xed part
of the contract which is adjusted in order to induce the agent to participate.
The timing of the problem is as follows: (1) the agent learns his type, then (2) the principal
oﬀers a menu of contracts {α(θ),β(θ)}θ∈Θ, (3) the agent chooses a contract, and (4) exerts eﬀort
accordingly, (5) the ￿rm produces pro￿t z and (6) the agent receives w = αz +β and the principal
3earns the net pro￿t, z − w. The certainty equivalence of the agent￿s utility is




that is, the expected wage, minus the cost of the eﬀort and the risk premium. The last term is
the origin of the negative relationship between risk and incentives in pure moral hazard models.
The risk premium acts as a cost because the principal must compensate the agent to induce him
to participate. Since the marginal risk premium with respect to α is increasing in both α and σ2,
the principal compensates an increase of σ2 by a reduction of α, and equates the marginal cost and
the marginal bene￿t of incentive. With adverse selection preceding moral hazard, a similar eﬀect
exists: the principal has to compensate the agent for the costs, in order to induce participation and
truth-telling.
Let e∗(α,θ) denote the agent θ￿s optimal choice of eﬀort, given α.N o t et h a te∗ is independent
of β. The resulting indirect utility is V (α,β,θ)=β + v(α,θ),w h e r e




is the non-linear term. Thus, the problem is reduced to an adverse selection problem where the
agent has quasi-linear utility V (α,β,θ).
We assume the principal is risk-neutral. Her utility, given θ, is the expectation of the net pro￿t,
that is, the pro￿t after the wage is paid to the agent,
U(α,β,θ)=E[z − w]=( 1 − α)￿(e∗(α,θ)) − β,
where the expectation is taken with respect to the conditional distribution of z,g i v e nt h ee ﬀort
choice of the agent θ under the contract (α,β).
The adverse selection problem is to ￿nd the functions α(•) and β(•) such that
(α(•),β(•)) ∈ argmaxE[U(α(θ),β(θ),θ)] (2)
subject to
V (α(θ),β(θ),θ) ≥ V (α(￿ θ),β(￿ θ),θ),for all θ, ￿ θ ∈ Θ,( 3 )
V (α(θ),β(θ),θ) ≥ 0,for all θ ∈ Θ.( 4 )
T h ee x p e c t a t i o ni n( 2 )i st a k e nw i t hr e s p e c tt oθ. The constraint (3) is the incentive compatibility
condition (IC). A function α(•) is called implementable, if there is a function β(•) that satis￿es IC.
4The constraint (4) is the participation constraint where the reservation utility is normalized to be
zero.
Guesnerie and Laﬀont (1984) fully characterize the optimal contract under the assumption of
single-crossing property, that is, the cross derivative vαθ has constant sign. The solution of the
model involves the de￿nition of the virtual surplus
f(α,θ)=￿(e∗(α,θ)) − c(e∗(α,θ)) −
1
2
α2θσ2(e∗(α,θ)) + (θ − θa)vθ(α,θ). (5)
The four terms represent the costs and the bene￿ts considered in the optimization: the average of
pro￿ts, the cost of eﬀort, the risk premium, and the informational rent. The pointwise maximization
of this function, that is, α1(θ)=a r gm a xf(α,θ), is the relaxed solution. The incentive assignment
of the optimal contract is the best monotone combination of the relaxed solution and intervals of
bunching.
In our model, we may use the envelope theorem to derive the marginal utility of incentive,
vα(α,θ)=￿(e∗(α,θ)) − αθσ2(e∗(α,θ)).
It is the mean of the pro￿ts minus the marginal risk premium. As agents with higher risk aversion
exert more eﬀort in risk reduction, the marginal risk premium term may increase or decrease
with the agent￿s risk aversion. Consequently, the cross derivative vαθ may have any sign. The
characterization of the optimal contracts in adverse selection problems without the single-crossing
property is analyzed in Araujo and Moreira (2001a), and Appendix A presents some results that
are relevant for the solution of our model. When the single-crossing property does not hold, discrete
pooling may occur: a discrete set of agent types may choose the same contract.
3 Two Examples: Single-Task and Multitask
We now examine two cases. In the single-task case, the agent eﬀort aﬀects only the mean of the
pro￿t. We show that the degree of incentives in the optimal contract decreases with risk. In the
multitask case, the variance and the mean are under control of the agent. Since the marginal cost
of incentives depends on the endogenous variance, the optimal contract may have a complex shape
that must be found numerically. Optimal contracts were computed for the multitask case and are
presented in Section 4.
53.1 Single-Task
We ￿rst analyze the single-task speci￿cation where agent￿s eﬀort controls only the mean of the
pro￿ts. Let e￿ denote the eﬀort and assume the mean of the pro￿ts is linear in e￿, ￿(e￿)=￿e￿,
and the cost of eﬀort is quadratic, c(e￿)=e2
￿/2.
The ￿rst-order condition of the agent￿s problem provides the optimal eﬀort, e∗
￿ = α￿.A s







and the marginal utility of incentive is vα = α￿2−αθσ2.A ni n c r e a s ei ni n c e n t i v e sh a sp o s i t i v ea n d
negative eﬀects on the utility of the agent. The positive eﬀe c ti st h ei n c r e a s eo ft h es h a r eo fp r o ￿ts.
T h en e g a t i v ee ﬀect comes from the increase of risk in the wage. The single-crossing property holds
for this case, since vαθ = −ασ2 < 0. An agent with low risk aversion has high marginal utility of
incentive and may choose a high-powered incentive contract.
The virtual surplus, as de￿ned in (5), is a concave function and the solution of the relaxed
problem is given by the ￿rst-order condition fα(α1(θ),θ)=0 .T h u s ,
α1(θ)=
￿2
￿2 +( 2 θ − θa)σ2.
The function α1 is decreasing in θ and vαθ is negative. In this case, the optimal contract of the
problem coincides with the relaxed solution. The variance σ2 has also a negative eﬀect on α,s i n c e
it increases the marginal cost of incentives present in the risk premium and in the informational
rent.
The relationship between α and σ2 is still negative, given θ. Therefore, adverse selection before
moral hazard is not suﬃcient to change the traditional risk-incentive trade-oﬀ.I f a g e n t c o n t r o l s
only the mean of the pro￿ts, risk does not aﬀect the bene￿t of principal, because she is risk neutral,
but increases the marginal cost, because she has to compensate for the risk premium and has to
pay the informational rent. Consequently, the incentives are lower in riskier projects.
3.2 Multitask
We introduce the possibility for the agent to control the variance of the pro￿ts. Let e￿ and eσ be the




σ).L e t ￿(e)=￿e￿ and σ2(e)=( σ0 − eσ)2, where the exogenous
6variance, σ0, is the variance when no eﬀort is provided to reduce it. Given these functional forms,
the optimal choices of eﬀort are
e∗





The eﬀort in mean e∗
￿ is higher, the higher is the incentive. The eﬀort in variance reduction e∗
σ
is higher, the higher is the incentive, the risk aversion and the exogenous variance of the pro￿ts.
This is the expected result, since higher α provides incentive to the agent increase average pro￿ts,
but, simultaneously, increases the risk of his payoﬀ. The risk-averse agent is induced to reduce
risk increasing e∗








0,i sd e c r e a s i n gi nα,f o rag i v e nσ2
0 and θ.









More intuitive expressions are obtained by the use of the envelope theorem:
vα = ￿e∗







The former states that the utility increases with α due to the mean of the pro￿ts, but decreases due
to the risk premium. The latter states that informational rent decreases with risk aversion. From




∂θ | {z }
=0








∂θ | {z }
>0
.
The ￿rst term is zero, that is, the marginal utility is not aﬀected by the eﬀort in the mean of the
pro￿ts. The other two terms stem from risk premium. The direct eﬀect, −α(σ0 − e∗
σ)2, has an
interpretation similar to the one in the single-task case: the higher is the risk aversion, the higher




∂θ ,a c t si no p p o s i t e
direction; marginal utility increases with θ because more risk-averse agents exert more eﬀort in risk




(1 + θα2)3 (6)
and the function α0(θ)=1/
√
θ de￿nes a decreasing border between vαθ > 0 and vαθ < 0 regions,
with vαθ > 0,f o rα > α0. For less risk-averse agents, the direct eﬀect dominates and the marginal
7utility of incentive decreases with risk aversion. For more risk-averse agents, the eﬀort produces a
stronger eﬀect, such that the second term dominates and vαθ > 0. This changes the self-selection
direction, that is, an agent with a higher degree of risk aversion has a higher marginal utility of
incentive, and chooses contracts with more power in incentives.
The next step is to de￿ne the virtual surplus and ￿nd the solution of the relaxed problem,
α1(θ). The incentive schedule of the optimal contract is α1(θ), whenever the incentive compati-
bility constraint is satis￿ed. As the single-crossing property does not hold, two points have to be
observed: ￿rst, the incentive compatibility cannot be trivially checked; and, second, if α1(θ) is not
implementable, the computation of optimal contract must follow the procedure presented in Ap-
pendix A. The optimal incentive schedule may have a complex form, resulting from a combination
of α1(θ), discrete pooling and continuous bunching.
We restrict the analysis to parameters values that satisfy the conditions in Araujo and Moreira
(2001a), as explained in Appendix B. For given σ0, ￿ and [θa,θb], we compute the optimal contract
α∗(θ) and the endogenous risk σ2(e∗(α∗(θ),θ)), then we plot the function α∗(θ),a n dt h er i s k -
incentive curve. In Section 4, the results for three representative cases are reported.
The relationship between incentives and endogenous risk is connected to the relationship between








When vαθ > 0, α(θ) is increasing and, consequently, risk is decreasing in θ. Therefore the relation-
ship between endogenous risk and incentives is negative. On the other hand, when vαθ < 0, α(θ)
is decreasing and risk and incentives may be positively related if θα2(θ) is increasing in θ.T h a ti s ,
the endogenous risk decreases with risk aversion, provided that α(θ) does not decrease too fast.
We show in Appendix B that the incentive in the relaxed solution is decreasing in σ0,t h e r e f o r e
the relationship between incentives and exogenous risk is negative when optimal contract coincides
with relaxed solution. For more complex contract schedules, the relationship is obtained numeri-
cally.
4R e s u l t s
The equations above for the multitask example were numerically implemented for three cases that
generate increasing, decreasing and mixed relationship between incentives and risk aversion. The
8parameter values, σ0 =0 .91 and ￿ = 1, are the same for the three cases, and the values of θa and
θb change for each case. These values were chosen in order to generate functions that are tractable
by the procedure detailed in Araujo and Moreira (2001a).
In Figure 1,f o rθ ∈ [2.5,3.5], the dotted line α0(θ) is the border between the vαθ < 0 region to
the left, and the vαθ > 0 region to the right. The relaxed solution α1(θ) is increasing in Θ,a n d
coincides with the optimal contract. Figure 2 is the corresponding plot for risk and incentives. An
agent with higher risk aversion exerts more eﬀort in risk reduction and this behavior reduces the
marginal cost from risk premium. This eﬀect more than compensates the increase in marginal cost
due to higher risk aversion. The net eﬀect is that more risk-averse agents choose higher-powered
incentive contracts and the relationship between risk and incentives is negative as in Holmstrom
and Milgrom (1987).
The contract for a set of types with lower risk aversion, θ ∈ [0.5,1.4], is shown in Figure 3. The
relaxed solution is implementable as vαθ(α1(θa),θb) < 0. The optimal contract coincides with the
relaxed solution, but this time the relationship is reversed. More risk-averse agents have higher
marginal cost of incentives, thus they prefer lower-powered incentive contracts. At the same time,
more risk-averse agents exert more eﬀort in risk reduction and the variance is lower. As is seen in
Figure 4, the risk and incentives are positively related.
For a broader interval of types, that encompasses vαθ of both signs, the discrete pooling is
possible and the optimal contract presents a U-shaped form. In Figure 5, the optimal contract
for θ ∈ [0.7,3.0] is plotted.1 Computational procedures found the optimal contract that combines
relaxed solution, discrete pooling and continuous bunching. Incentives and risk aversion are pos-
itively related for more risk-averse agents and negatively related for less risk-averse agents. The
U-shape of the optimal contract is also present in risk-incentive graph, as we can see in Figure 6.
The results above are concerned with the endogenous risk. The relationship between exogenous
risk and incentives is negative for the ￿rst two cases, since the optimal contracts coincide with the
relaxed solutions. For the third case, the sensitivity dα/dσ0 was numerically calculated and plotted
in Figure 7. Note that the sensitivity is negative, which suggests that the incentives decrease with
exogenous risk.
1As prescribed in Appendix B, the validity of assumptions A2 and A3 were checked numerically.
95C o n c l u s i o n
The negative relationship between risk and incentives, found in standard models of moral hazard,
is not preserved in the presence of adverse selection, if the agent can control the variance. A more
risk-averse agent exerts more eﬀort in reduction of risk. The relationship between risk and incentives
is positive if more risk-averse agents select lower-powered incentive contracts. This is true when
the marginal utility of incentive is decreasing with respect to the agent￿s risk aversion. However,
if risk aversion is high enough, the possibility of risk reduction may reverse this eﬀect and the
traditional negative relationship between risk and incentives may be found. The optimal contract
may also be U-shaped, such that agents with intermediate degrees of risk aversion choose contracts
with low incentives, and agents with extremely high or extremely low degree of risk aversion choose
high-powered incentive contracts. These conclusion holds for endogenous risk. With respect to the
exogenous risk, the numerical calculations suggest that the relationship between incentives and risk
remains negative.
Apendix A
A Adverse Selection without the Single-Crossing Property
The general model presented in Section 2 reduces to the maximization problem (2) subject to in-
centive compatibility and participation constraints. It diﬀers from the traditional adverse selection
model because the objective function does not have the single-crossing property. We present be-
low the main steps toward the solution, stressing the peculiarities that arise when single-crossing
property is absent. Most of the results are developed in Araujo and Moreira (2001a).
A.1 Incentive Compatibility and Participation Constraint
When α(•) and β(•) are diﬀerentiable, the incentive compatibility may be locally checked by the
￿rst and second order conditions. These conditions are necessary but not suﬃcient for incentive
compatibility. The ￿rst order condition gives
vα(α(θ),θ)α0(θ)+β0(θ)=0 , (7)
10which states that indiﬀerence curves of type θ agent must be tangent to an implementable contract
on α ￿ β plane, at point (α(θ),β(θ)).
The second order condition gives
vαα(α(θ),θ)[α0(θ)]2 + vα(α(θ),θ)α00(θ)+β00(θ) ≤ 0, (8)
and, after diﬀerentiating (7) with respect to θ, the expression (8) simpli￿es to the condition
vαθ(α(θ),θ)α0(θ) ≥ 0, (9)
which implies the monotonicity of α(θ), in the single-crossing context.
Given the menu of implementable contracts {α(θ),β(θ)}θ∈Θ, the level of utility achieved by the
agent with risk aversion θ is his informational rent and denoted r(θ),t h a ti s ,r(θ)=v(α(θ),θ)+β(θ).
Using (7), we get
r0(θ)=vθ(α(θ),θ), (10)
and applying the envelope theorem on equation (1), we have vθ(α,θ)=−1
2α2σ2(e∗) < 0.C o n -
sequently, the agent with the highest the risk aversion has the lowest informational rent and the
participation constraint is active for him, that is, r(θb)=0 .




vθ(α(￿ θ), ￿ θ)d￿ θ − v(α(θ),θ), (11)
which allows us to eliminate β(•) from the problem and focus on the characterization of α(•).
A.2 Implementability without the Single-Crossing Property
Since the single-crossing property is not ensured, the ￿rst and the second order conditions are
necessary but they are not suﬃcient. The following points must be observed:
1. The function α(θ) may be non-monotone. The same contract may be chosen by a discrete set
of agents. We call this situation as discrete pooling. In this case, the pooled types follow the
conjugation rule
vα(α(θ),θ)=vα(α(θ0),θ0), (12)
whenever α(θ)=α(θ0), which states that the indiﬀerence curves of θ and θ0 are both tangent
at the same point to the menu of contracts on α ￿ β plane.
112. The incentive compatibility must be globally checked. When the single-crossing property
holds, local incentive compatibility implies global incentive compatibility, that is, if types
in the neighborhood of θ is not better with the contract assigned to θ, no other type will
be better. This means that the ￿rst and second order conditions are suﬃcient for incentive
compatibility. On the other hand, when the single-crossing property is violated, types out
of the neighborhood of θ may prefer the contract assigned to θ.I n t h i s c a s e , t h e ￿rst and
second order conditions are not suﬃcient and further conditions must be imposed to obtain
implementability.
3. The function α(θ) may be discontinuous. The possibility of discrete pooling creates jumps
in the optimal assignment of contracts, so we allow the contract to be piecewise continuous.
Where jump occurs, the agent must be indiﬀerent between the start and the end point of the
jump. If, for example, the agent θ were strictly better with the end point than the start point,
then, for a small ε > 0, the agents with type in [θ − ε,θ] would strictly prefer the end point,
a n dn oj u m pc o u l de x i s ti nθ.
The following de￿nition will be useful for global analysis of incentive compatibility. For a given






vαθ(￿ α, ￿ θ)d￿ α
#
d￿ θ. (13)
It can be shown, using (10), that Φ(θ, ￿ θ)=V (α(θ),β(θ),θ) − V (α(￿ θ),β(￿ θ),θ),t h u sΦ(θ, ￿ θ) is the
diﬀerence for agent θ between the utility of the contract assigned to himself and the one assigned
to ￿ θ. The incentive compatibility constraint can be stated as
Φ(θ, ￿ θ) ≥ 0, for all θ, ￿ θ ∈ Θ,
that is, the agent with risk aversion θ is not better pretending to be an agent with risk aversion ￿ θ.
The function Φ(θ, ￿ θ) is appropriate for a graphical analysis, since the signal of vαθ is known and
the integration is performed in the region between the constant α(￿ θ) and the curve α(￿ θ).
A.3 Virtual Surplus and the Principal￿s Problem
We follow the standard procedure and de￿ne the social surplus,





f(α,θ)=S(α,θ)+( θ − θa)vθ(α,θ). (15)
The maximization of social surplus for each θ gives the ￿rst best of the model. The virtual surplus
is the social surplus plus the informational rent term. This term is negative and represents a cost
that takes into account the rent that is paid to the agents with risk aversion in [θa,θ],i no r d e rt o
preserve implementability when agent θ receives α(θ).
As types are uniformly distributed, the expectation of integral term in (11)m a yb es i m p l i ￿ed by
Fubini￿s theorem to, E
hR θb
θ vθ(α(￿ θ), ￿ θ)d￿ θ
i
= E [vθ(α(θ),θ)(θ − θa)].T h u s ,β(θ) can be eliminated
from the principal￿s objective function, which can be rewritten as E[f(α(θ),θ)].A f t e rt h eo p t i m a l
incentive, α∗(θ), is found, the ￿xed part of optimal contract, β∗(θ), can be calculated using (11).
The maximization problem of principal without the constraints is called relaxed problem. Its
solution, denoted α1(θ),s a t i s ￿es
fα(α1(θ),θ)=0 and fαα(α1(θ),θ) < 0.
Since fα(α1(θ),θ)=Sα(α1(θ),θ)+(θ−θa)vαθ(α1(θ),θ), the relaxed solution provides less incentive
than the ￿rst best when vαθ < 0, and more incentive when vαθ > 0. This distortion occurs because
the cross derivative is associated with the marginal cost of informational rent. For example, when
vαθ < 0, the cost of informational rent is increasing with respect to α, therefore the principal pays
less incentive.
A.4 Optimality without the Single-Crossing Property
In the standard adverse selection model, the single-crossing property ensures that α1(θ) is the
optimal contract if (9) is satis￿ed, that is, α1(θ) is non-increasing when vαθ < 0, or non-decreasing
when vαθ > 0.W h e nα1(θ) is non-monotone, the optimal contract is the best combination of α1(θ)
and intervals of bunching so that (9) is satis￿ed. Such procedure is not suitable in the absence of the
single-crossing property. As before, α1(θ) is the optimal contract if it is implementable. However,
monotonicity condition (9) is no more suﬃcient for implementability and global incentive condition
must be checked.
When vαθ changes its sign, the discrete pooling is possible and α1(θ) is not the optimal contract
for the pooled types. The assignment of contracts to the discretely pooled types must take into
13account the conjugation of types according to the constraint (12). Let αu(θ) denote the optimum








where θ0 is given by vα(αu(θ),θ)=vα(αu(θ0),θ0) and αu(θ)=αu(θ0). The optimal contract will be
a combination of α1(θ),b u n c h i n ga n dαu(θ).
We follow Araujo and Moreira (2001a) and restrict the solution α∗(θ) to the closure of the
continuous functions. It means that when there is a jump in α(θ) all the intermediate contracts in
the jump is oﬀered to the agent. The optimal contract with discrete pooling can be characterized
under the following assumptions:
A1. vαθ(α,θ)=0de￿nes a decreasing function α0(θ), vαθ is positive above and negative below
α0(θ), for all θ ∈ Θ.
A2. α1 is U-shaped, crosses α0 in an increasing way, α1(θa) ≤ α1(θb), fα(α,θ) is negative above
and positive below α1(θ),f o ra l lθ ∈ Θ.
A3. For each ￿ θ, the equations vα(α1(•),•)=vα(α1(•), ￿ θ) have at most one solution in the decreasing
part of α1,o nvαθ < 0 region.





αu(θ), if θ < θ1,
α1(θ), if θ ≥ θ1,
(17)





α1(θ), if θ < θ2,
min{ﬂ α,αu(θ)}, if θ ≥ θ2,
(18)
2To be rigorous, we should consider the case in which the jump transition from αu-segment to α1-segment takes
place in θj < θ1. In this case, the contracts for [θa, ˆ θj],w h e r eˆ θj i st h ec o n j u g a t eo fθj, are the conjugates of the
contracts in the vertical line, at the jump. For the examples worked in this paper, the characterization above suﬃces.
For further details see Araujo and Moreira (2001a)
14where ﬂ α is the incentive of the continuous bunching and θ2 is de￿ned by α1(θ2)=ﬂ α.T h e s e t o f
bunched types, J = {θ ∈ Θ : α(θ)=ﬂ α},s a t i s ￿es
Z
J
fα(ﬂ α,θ)p(θ)dθ =0 .
Apendix B
B Optimal Contract in the Multitask Speci￿cation





α2(α2θ2 +2 θ − θa)
2(1 + α2θ)2 σ2
0.
The derivative with respect to α is
fα(α,θ)=( 1 − α)￿2 −
α[θ(1 + α2θa)+( θ − θa)]
(1 + α2θ)3 σ2
0
and the relaxed solution α1(θ) is given by fα(α1(θ),θ)=0and fαα(α1(θ),θ) < 0.N o t e t h a t
fα(0,θ) > 0 and fα(1,θ) < 0, so relaxed problem has an interior solution and fα(•,θ) has at least
one root in the interval [0,1].I ff(•,θ) is not concave in α, the incentive that maximizes the virtual
surplus must be correctly chosen among solutions of the ￿rst order condition.
Writing fα as a function of σ0, it is ease to see that ∂fα/∂σ0 < 0,a n d ,a sfαα(α1(θ),θ) < 0,t h e
application of the theorem of implicit function on fα(α1(θ),θ)=0gives dα1/dσ0 < 0.T h a ti s ,f o r
ag i v e nθ, an increase of exogenous risk reduces incentives on relaxed solution.
When vαθ(α1(θ),θ) has ambiguous sign, the optimal contract must consider the possibility of
discrete pooling. When θ and ￿ θ are discretely pooled at incentive α, the conjugation rule (12)
relates the pooled types by ￿ θ(α,θ)=1/θα4. Then, working on condition (16), we obtain the
discrete pooling segment αu(θ) as the solution of the equation
(1 − α)(1 + θα2)2(1 + θ2α4)=2 θ2α3σ2
0
￿2.
The numerical examples presented in Section 4 correspond to three cases for which we can
characterize the optimal contract.
(a) α1(θ) is increasing and vαθ(α1(θ),θ) > 0.
Since α0(θ) is decreasing, the integral in Φ(θ, ￿ θ) t a k e sv a l u e si nvαθ > 0 region. Therefore
Φ(θ, ￿ θ) > 0 and α1(θ) is the optimal contract.
15(b) α1(θ) is decreasing and vαθ(α1(θ),θ) < 0.
As u ﬃcient condition for implementability is vαθ(α1(θa),θb) < 0.A s α0(θ) is a decreasing
function, the integral in Φ(θ, ￿ θ) t a k e sv a l u e si nvαθ < 0 region. Then Φ(θ, ￿ θ) > 0 and α1(θ) is
the optimal contract.
(c) vαθ(α1(θ),θ) changes sign only once.
In this case, the optimal contract can be computed by the procedure in Appendix A, if
assumptions A1, A2 and A3 hold. Assumption A1 holds since, from equation (6), the function
α0(θ)=1/
√
θ de￿nes a decreasing border between vαθ > 0 and vαθ < 0 regions, with vαθ > 0,
for α > α0. The following lemma shows that the ￿rst part of assumption A2 holds.
Lemma 1 Let θx be deﬁned by α1(θx)=α0(θx).I fθx exists, α0
1(θx) > 0.






and, as second order condition states that fαα(α1(θ),θ) < 0, α0
1(θ) has the same sign as
fαθ(α1(θ),θ).D i ﬀerentiating fα with respect to θ,
fαθ(α,θ)=
−2α[1 − 2α2(θ − θa) − α4θθa]
(1 + α2θ)4
and manipulating this expression, we conclude that α0





On α0(θ), α = 1/
√
θ. Then, h(α0(θx),θx)=θx(1 − θa/θx)(2 + θa/θx),w h i c hi sp o s i t i v ef o r
θx > θa. Therefore α0
1(θx) > 0. ¥
However, the second part of A2, and A3 is not valid for every value of parameters and must
be checked before the application of the procedure in Appendix A.
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Figure 1: Optimal contract. Θ =[ 2 .5,3.5].














Figure 2: Risk ￿ incentives. Θ =[ 2 .5,3.5].

















Figure 3: Optimal contract. Θ =[ 0 .5,1.4].















Figure 4: Risk ￿ incentives. Θ =[ 0 .5,1.4].

















Figure 5: Optimal contract. Θ =[ 0 .7,3.0].














Figure 6: Risk ￿ incentives. Θ =[ 0 .7,3.0].















Figure 7: Exogenous risk ￿ incentives. Θ =[ 0 .7,3.0].
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